libertango: (Default)
Yeah, yeah, I know. I shouldn't have looked at Mr. Pournelle's reactions, because they were only likely to annoy someone like myself, who insists on empirical, observable reasons for things.

Still. Like the wag who once said they'd known Daniel Day-Lewis so long they could remember when he was English, I've known Jerry Pournelle so long I can remember when he was a patriot. So I was curious, and hope springs eternal.

Pournelle doesn't give evidence of seeing the obvious parallels between McChrystal and McClellan I've mentioned. That's fine in and of itself, but the reason mostly appears to be he'd rather work with Rome as his parallel of choice. Again, I have no objection to that per se, until he says this:

"The purpose of the military is to break things and kill people. Will the Legions in Afghanistan be permitted to do that?"

Um... When it comes to "the" purpose of the military, not just no, but hell, no.

Here's what FM-3, Operations says:

"The Army organizes, trains, and equips its forces to fight and win the nation’s wars and achieve directed national objectives. Fighting and winning the nation’s wars is the foundation of Army service—the Army’s nonnegotiable contract with the American people and its enduring obligation to the nation. (emphasis added)

Sometimes, breaking things and killing people is how you fight and win the nation’s wars.

But sometimes, it isn't -- and fighting and winning is the "nonnegotiable contract" that takes priority over one old man's teenager-at-any-age impulses to break things and kill people.

That's the thing with reading Pournelle -- it almost always feels like being in a time machine, and the past 55 years haven't happened.

He then goes on to make what, at first blush, appears to be a good point:

"I have always been opposed to any massive US presence in Afghanistan. I do not really want the Legions to learn how to govern without the consent of the governed..."

I'll speculate a moment here, and guess that if you asked Pournelle the danger, it's he wants to keep the taste of a military coup out of the mouth of our armed forces.

Here are the problems I can think of with that, though, off the top of my head:

* For God's sake, Jerry, has there been a span of more than three years since 1861 when "the Legions" weren't governing some patch of land without the consent of the governed? Some of the years in question were on US soil, even. Pournelle was born in Louisiana and grew up in Memphis. It's tough to imagine he doesn't realize this (and can't think of examples since Reconstruction in the South of the Army governing some patch of land without the consent of the governed). After 150 years, I think the precedent has been set.

* It implies today's United States Army is no better than the armed forces of a banana republic, just waiting for the civilian authority to let down its guard. I don't think Pournelle (or anyone else with that attitude) can show more contempt to today's soldiers than that.

"If the United States wants to be in the Empire business, it will need to develop two kinds of military force: the nation builders, and the Legions."

This is where Pournelle decides to channel Walt Whitman ("Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes.)"). But refreshingly, it's one of the few hints Pournelle has read anything on military affairs more recent than 1985 (notably, Tom Barnett, and I again call your attention to his talk at TED for a 24 minute quickie version of his "brief" which calls for a similar split in the military). Though, you never know, perhaps Pournelle came up with the idea independently -- the idea that such an approach is necessary for "Empire" and not just for, you know, fighting and winning the nation's wars would seem to argue for such detachment on Pournelle's part from current conversations the rest of the world are having.

But here's the real problem: Rome itself didn't follow Pournelle's model. Relative to the size of the Empire, relative to the size of the Legions, relative to the centuries they ruled... They just didn't "break things and kill people" all that often. The Legions were "the nation builders," most of the time. We're talking pre-capitalism, pre-corporatism -- it's not like the private sector had the wherewithal to do all that much of Imperial scope.

But why let the historical record get in the way of a good story?
libertango: (Default)
(No, not the magazine...)

One of the most egregious among his many blunders of fact during the debate was when Mr. McCain "corrected" Mr. Obama on a particular set of terms... while being blissfully unaware he was getting it wrong.

From the transcript:

*^*^*

OBAMA: (The soldiers in The Surge) have done a brilliant job, and General Petraeus has done a brilliant job. But understand, that was a tactic designed to contain the damage of the previous four years of mismanagement of this war.

And so John likes -- John, you like to pretend like the war started in 2007. You talk about the surge. The war started in 2003, and at the time when the war started, you said it was going to be quick and easy. You said we knew where the weapons of mass destruction were. You were wrong.

You said that we were going to be greeted as liberators. You were wrong. You said that there was no history of violence between Shiite and Sunni. And you were wrong. And so my question is...

LEHRER: Senator Obama...

OBAMA: ... of judgment, of whether or not -- of whether or not -- if the question is who is best-equipped as the next president to make good decisions about how we use our military, how we make sure that we are prepared and ready for the next conflict, then I think we can take a look at our judgment.

LEHRER: I have got a lot on the plate here...

MCCAIN: I'm afraid Senator Obama doesn't understand the difference between a tactic and a strategy.

*^*^*

McCain hasn't been in the active military since 1981. And he was 894th out of 899 in his Annapolis class of 1958. So perhaps it's understandable why he went astray.

But, here's what the Army currently says in field manual FM-3, Operations:

*^*^*

THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

2-4. The strategic level is that level at which a nation, often as one of a group of nations, determines national and multinational security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish them. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives. The National Command Authorities (NCA) translate policy into national strategic military objectives. These national strategic objectives facilitate theater strategic planning. Military strategy, derived from policy, is the basis for all operations (see JP 3-0). (emphasis in original)

*^*^*

So, strategy is the big picture stuff. "We will be victorious in Iraq to foster democracy in the Middle East," is a strategy. "We will address the threat of the Soviet Union by containing them in a cordon of surrounding allied countries," is a strategy.

Strategy answers the question, "What do you want?"

*^*^*

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

2-5. The operational level of war is the level at which campaigns and major operations are conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations (AOs). It links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art—the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. A campaign is a related series of military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. A major operation is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces of a single or several services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational, and sometimes strategic objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially under a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces are employed to influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Figure 2-1 illustrates the link between the levels of war and the plans and actions of military forces. (emphasis in original)

*^*^*

Tactics, then, answers the question, "How are you going to get what you want?"

From this definition, it's clear The Surge is a major operation. It's a series of tactical operations, with the strategic goal of keeping violence in Iraq at a manageable level while the political infrastructure is built by the Iraqis.

Tactically it's been a great success. Petraeus and his troops have executed very well.

But strategically it's been a failure. Because instead of taking advantage of the relative calm The Surge has provided them, the Iraqi political leadership has stalled in so many different ways to make Congress' performance this week the very model of effectiveness. (Thus the ghost of Garrison Keillor: "It could always be worse...")

But more than that... I'm not alone in noticing this. Jim Fallows quotes "a retired (1999) Army colonel" to the same point. Even more damningly, in some ways, was this post by Jim on McCain's personal ignorance of strategy vs. tactics:

"There has been no greater contrast between the Obama and McCain campaigns than the tactical-vs-strategic difference, with McCain demonstrating the primacy of short-term tactics and Obama sticking to a more coherent long-term strategy. And McCain's dismissive comment suggests that he still does not realize this."

And remember, folks... The military stuff is what McCain thinks he's good at.
libertango: (Default)
Which of course only means I agree with him, but hey.

I was browsing the TED site (as you do), and ran across this cogent, mordantly funny presentation about military power by Thomas P.M. Barnett. Funniest laugh out line so far (I haven't even finished watching the clip, and want to pass the guy along): "Every time we lead one of these efforts we have to whip ourselves into this 'imminent threat' thing. We haven't faced an 'imminent threat' since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962."

Turns out he has a blog, which a quick scan shows is a) only slightly jargon heavy, and b) reasonably solid.
libertango: (Default)
In a comment thread at David Sucher's City Comforts, we've been talking about the administration's domestic spying program. One person said this:

"I was always dissatisfied with prior liberal complaints that we civilians had no sacrifice that we had to bear. I always thought that it was a crock, that the inevitable erosion of liberty in wartime was real sacrifice and that victory demanded such sacrifices as we temporarily acquiesce to the state powers that should be stripped of it in peacetime."

Leave aside the premise as to whether we are "in wartime" (Here's H.J.Res.114, which is the act authorizing force in Iraq. Look at Section 3, and tell me if we've achieved those things. If we have, any other use of force is unauthorized, folks. Which was Rep. Murtha's point. But I digress.)... As I say, leave that aside. The other premise bothers me even more. That is, that in wartime, an erosion of liberty is "inevitable."

I don't believe it is, at all. I'm squarely with William Pitt on this one: "Necessity is the plea for every infringement of human freedom. It is the argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves."

Now, if you want to say it's more difficult to fight a war while upholding liberty, I'd agree with that. But you know what? We're Americans. I think we're tough enough, and we can rise to the challenge. If you want to say this president is too weak to do the job correctly, I'd agree with you that far.

John Kerry had a great line in the first presidential debate, back on Sept. 30, 2004. It was this:

"Just because the president says it can't be done... doesn't mean it can't be done."

I thought Kerry should have hammered home on that in the close of the campaign. Just because Bush has said he has to break the law to fight terrorism, doesn't mean that someone better couldn't do the job legally. It only means this president couldn't manage to find the gumption to do it.

Here's what I really think: I think it's easy to stick to your principles when times are easy. I think it's hard to stick to your principles when times are hard.

I think that's why they call some times "easy," and some times "hard."

I think that as soon as times became hard, Bush lacked the character to stick to American constitutional principles.

But that doesn't mean it was, "inevitable." It just means this particular president failed.

It doesn't mean it can't be done.
libertango: (Default)
David Brooks has another dismal column in the New York Times today. But it ends on a hook that gives me a chance to go out on a limb.

Brooks does a poor-man's variant on a Bill Safire device, that of re-writing someone's speech, or trying to get inside their thoughts. I kind of understand why Safire likes this device, as he's a former speechwriter. If Brooks was a former novelist it might make a bit more sense. But as it is...

So the re-write in question is of Jorge's tongue-tied to the point of stream-of-consciousness interview with Tim Russert on Meet the Press. Here's Brooks' last paragraph, speaking as Bush:

"I could lose this election. I don't know whether the American people are with me or not. But I know our hair-trigger reputation has jolted dictators in Libya, North Korea and elsewhere. I know that if in 20 years Iraq is free and the Arab world is progressing toward normalcy, no one will doubt that I did the right thing."

Oh, yeah. God knows Bush's behavior has caused a jolt in behavior North Korea. So much so that history may well write, "George W. Bush -- Father of the North Korean Bomb".

But, as readers of this LJ know, I had a success rate of 63% when I made 8 predictions regarding the war in Iraq. The big score there: I predicted we would never find any WMD, because the Administration's behavior makes it clear that not even they believe the weapons existed.

So, here's that limb, complete with saw: Iraq will not be free in 20 months, let alone 20 years. 20 months would be... October 2005. Yeah, that sounds safe.

By October 2005, there will be one of four outcomes in Iraq:

* A weak but basically authoritarian regime is still in power, propped up by US troops. (The current status quo.)

* US troops are out, and there's an Islamic theocracy. (This is the "democratic" option, and why, rhetoric to the contrary, we're butt-scared about democracy breaking out in Iraq.)

* US troops are out, and there's another Hussein/Mubarak/Somoza/arap Moi/Marcos/Diem/Musharraf mostly-"friendly" dictator installed.

* US troops are out, and Iraq has broken up into three countries -- Kurdistan, "Iraq" (the Sunni enclave), and... Let's call it Basrastan (the Shi'ite enclave). Basrastan would be an Islamic theocracy (again). Kurdistan may or may not be at war with Turkey. "Iraq" would have no oil, probably be secular, and possibly authoritarian again.

I'll tell you the truth -- I'm not sure which one is the "best" scenario here. But it's where we're going, as of this writing.

Now, all things are provisional, pending better data. It's possible that somehow the Administration will start treating the situation with finesse and competence, and actually figure out a way to rebuild Iraq so that the Iraqis like and cooperate with us. To put John Kerry's spin on it, they might stop fucking up.

What I see as more likely, though, is another Vietnam... But not the way that's usually meant. I think what will happen is that regardless of the final outcome, we have so alienated the Iraqi people that some few will immigrate to the US and become incredibly prosperous, while the remainder stay at home and refuse to have anything to do with us for at least 20 years. Just like Vietnam. Or Iran. In fact, I think the US withdrawal from Iraq, if it happens before the election like so many seem to think it will, will look spookily like the withdrawal from Vietnam, people clinging to helicopters and all.
libertango: (Default)
...you know, the boys haven't had a live training exercise in an amphibious assault for a loooooooong time.

This goes back to my high school history teacher's reason for why the UK would never fully settle the Northern Ireland dispute. It was too useful to the UK military as a live training exercise.

It should be noted that he himself was an expat Brit.

And besides -- not unlike Iraq, the Administration probably already knows that Syria has no WMD... unlike Iran or North Korea, both of which the Cowardly Lion continues to treat with kid gloves. Wouldn't want our hands to get too messy, y'know.

Go, Sy, go

Mar. 31st, 2003 09:56 pm
libertango: (Default)
Sy Hersh's New Yorker article, previously quoted here via a Reuters report, is now online.
libertango: (Default)
The New York Times has an article where Rumsfeld tries the Reagan Defense -- he can't recall making any statements he has made -- and tries strenuously to hand off the war planning process to Gen. Tommy Franks. So, when the going gets tough, the tough blame their subordinates. (I hope he's just as calm about this when Jorge does the same thing to him.)

But, down at the end of the article, we find this:

Mr. Rumsfeld said that he was not concerned that the United States had yet to find any weapons of mass destruction. He said most of such weapons are believed to be at sites closer to Baghdad, and troops had not yet reached them.

Mind you, this is the same Administration that, until two weeks ago, was saying the weapons were so widely dispersed across the whole territory of Iraq that the UN inspectors could never find them. Now, ever so conveniently, the weapons are concentrated in Baghdad... Where they couldn't have been used for the last 12 years against either the Kurds or the Iranians, or our own troops, no, nowhere as operationally useful as that...

Snark hunt. Soon to be a boojum.
libertango: (Default)
A few weeks ago, Tom Friedman of the New York Times came up with a striking image. Imagine a table, with a box, Monty Hall Let's Make a Deal-style.

Inside the box is one of two notes: "Congratulations! You just won the Arab Germany. All it will take is the removal of an atrocious regime, and this country will become peaceful, productive, and happy." -- Or -- "Congratulations! You just won the Arab Yugoslavia. This country is so fractious and divided, no amount of gentle perusasion will rule it successfully, so it has to be led by an iron hand, no matter what ideology they may have." Friedman then pointed out that the only way we'd ever know what was in the box was to open it.

Trouble is... I'm beginning to think there's a third note: "Congratulations! You just won Palestine. Only there's 80 times more land mass, and 9 times more people."

This is all by way of pointing to an article in the Asia Times that Tacitus links to. He mentions it largely because it describes how, "an estimated 5,200 Iraqis have crossed the Jordanian-Iraqi border, going back "to defend their homeland" as they invariably put it." Tacitus thinks this is bad because of these ex-pats forming the core of a future guerilla movement against us if or when we topple Saddam.

My point, as we in the US kick back and forth the question of just how difficult this venture will be, is that the Israelis have put forth a lot of military effort in subduing the Palestinians.

For 50 years.

And, while Israel may be said to have achieved some of its objectives because it does, after all, still exist... Can anyone truly say they have won against the Palestinians?

Further... Just how likely is it, do you think, that the US is willing to exert the same proportional effort against the Iraqis as the Israelis have against the Palestinians? More than that, just how effective would such a move be?

For 50 years.

"Oceania is at war with Eastasia. Oceania has always been at war with Eastasia."
libertango: (Default)
From Reuters:

Report: Rumsfeld Ignored Pentagon Advice on Iraq

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld repeatedly rejected advice from Pentagon planners that substantially more troops and armor would be needed to fight a war in Iraq, (the) New Yorker (m)agazine reported.

In an article for its April 7 edition, which goes on sale on Monday, the weekly said Rumsfeld insisted at least six times
(emphasis added -- hbo) in the run-up to the conflict that the proposed number of ground troops be sharply reduced and got his way.

"He thought he knew better. He was the decision-maker at every turn," the article quoted an unidentified senior Pentagon planner as saying. "This is the mess Rummy put himself in because he didn't want a heavy footprint on the ground."

*-*-*

Much of the supply of Tomahawk cruise missiles has been expended, aircraft carriers were going to run out of precision guided bombs and there were serious maintenance problems with tanks, armored vehicles and other equipment, the article said.

"The only hope is that they can hold out until reinforcements arrive," the former official said.
libertango: (Default)
"Amateurs talk about strategy; Professionals talk about logistics."

attributed to former General R.H. Barrows, Commandant, USMC




Since the First World War, the US Army has recognized nine principles of war. One of those principles is the principle of mass, which dictates that the commander must be able to apply decisive force at the decisive point. This is basic, enduring doctrine, not passé theory or the latest tactical fad.

The Allied commander in Iraq no longer has this option. He does not have the ability to properly apply the warfighting principle of mass. What he has, instead, is one mechanized infantry division -- the Third -- strung out along a 100-mile front; a Marine Expeditionary Unit equally stretched; roughly a division of hardbitten Britons tied up far from the war-winning objective; and large elements of the 101st Airborne Division still generally uncommitted to the fight. Make no mistake -- their achievements in the first week of the war have been nothing short of magnificent. They have traveled swift and far, time and again defeated numerically superior forces, and accomplished logistical feats that will take their rightful place beside the Red Ball Express and the Berlin Airlift in the annals of history.

But they cannot win the war.


From "Tacitus"




"The main Marine thrust is now northwest of Diwaniyah, and may have already cut that city off. Marines with that formation report they're down to one meal a day's rations."

From Flit




"In eight days of warfare we have yet to see a confirmed report of an Iraqi T-72 tank being destroyed. Not one. They have somewhere over 500 of them that can still move, as far as people can tell, all in the Guard divisions. The Medina Division, the one Guard division that's been engaged at all, certainly had 100-150 of them at least. They've been seen... just not engaged or killed yet. Not that the T-72's so special, but it is somewhat more dangerous than the tanks the Allies have been busting up, which have been only the 40 year-old T-55s so far. Just something to think about."

Also from Flit




"The enemy that we're fighting is different from the one we'd war gamed," U.S. Army Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace told Washington Post correspondent Rick Atkinson. Wallace is commander of the Army V Corps, which was tested by an Iraqi ground probe overnight. "We knew they were there-the paramilitaries-but we didn't know they'd fight like this," he said. Asked if this signaled a longer war than projected, he replied, "It's beginning to look that way."

From the Washington Post




"The division is out of rations," Brig. Gen. Charles Fletcher said, talking to his commander, Maj. Gen. Walter Wojdakowski, who is still stationed back at Camp Virginia in Kuwait.

Fletcher was referring to 3rd Infantry Division fighters who were heavily engaged, as he spoke, by members of Saddam Hussein's elite Medina Division, about 25 miles north of here in and around the town of Najaf.


From the Scripps Howard News Service, via the News Tribune in Tacoma.




"First, the idea of precision guided weapons—you're really talking about money," (retired Admiral and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, William Crowe) said. "In the Gulf War, we almost ran through our entire stock of precision weapons. We took out targets that cost less than the weapon. Tomahawks are about a million bucks apiece. If you run out, you need something else. Most of the targets we destroyed in the Gulf War were destroyed by iron bombs. Also, in a really tough war you can't avoid head-on confrontation entirely. You just can't. My God, if you think you can support arms on the ground with air coming in from three thousand miles away—that's sheer nonsense. And, if it's protracted, you run out of sophisticated stuff. So numbers become important and amount of equipment becomes important."

From the New Yorker's issue of 16 July 2001.




I'm increasingly having the sinking feeling that neither technology nor sheer warmaking ability is going be crucial for too much longer. If those troops don't get fed and don't get water in the next 48 hours, we're sunk.




But, on the other hand, also from Tacitus:

For the moment, let's list some of the worst-case scenarios that have not happened since the war began:

  • No discernable al Qaeda activity.

  • No discernable terrorist activity.

  • No Arab regimes overthrown or seriously threatened.

  • No chemical/biological weapons use.

  • No en masse destruction of oil fields.

  • No general destruction of Euphrates or Tigris bridges.

  • No Turkish invasion of Kurdistan.

  • No opportunistic attacks by North Korea, China, Israel, et al.

  • No catastrophic disruption of oil supplies.

    One or more of these may happen before it's all over, of course (I'm still guessing WMD use at the gates of Baghdad), but let's take silver linings where we may.
  • libertango: (Default)
    Bruce Rolston's weblog, Flit.

    Rolston is a Canadian military officer. In addition to the blog, he's also maintaining a situation map. Note that the map uses NATO military graphics/symbols. (I wonder what he thinks of Decisive Action.)
    libertango: (Default)
    Back in August, I was having a discussion with a fellow in another forum about psychological warfare. And the topic of Paul Linebarger (known to science fiction fans as Cordwainer Smith) came up:

    Sez me: In re all war being based on deception... enh. For a PSYOP guy, that doesn't sound too Linebarger-ish to me. {shrug}

    Sez he: As for Linebarger, he was old school but given his due for his time and helping in the birth of PYSOP (about 5 minutes worth during the 1 hour history of PSYOP class). Things changed a lot during and immediately after the war he skipped (Vietnam), but even more so once we were pulled into SOCOM in the '80s.

    Sez me: Given the contrast in results between the conflicts in which Linebarger participated and those he didn't, perhaps a bit more study would be in order. Not that that was the only variable, but still...

    He huffed and puffed a bit after that.

    Still... It was more than amusing to me to see headlines this week like, "Coalition Forces Drop Nearly 2 Million Leaflets Over Iraq." Which would be a tactic right out Linebarger's landmark book, Psychological Warfare...

    Fuckin' poser. :)
    libertango: (Default)
    Dear Jorge Arbusto:

    (two can play this silly-ass cutesy nickname game.)

    OK. So, you hoped against hope -- given the crap quality of the intel you've had from the CIA during your residency so far -- that you had the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein pinpointed.

    That's cool, and I appreciate the chutzpah of dumping your war plans to attempt to "decapitate" Iraq.

    But, um... Jorge. Amigo. A few things.

    * What does it say about your supposed quest for disarming Iraq, if you were willing to throw the command structure over those weapons into chaos, given that you don't have control over them?

    * What does it mean when, presumably, you have someone inside Hussein's circle both close enough to him to know where he is, and is willing to fink him out to get him killed... But you don't have anyone willing to say where these much hypothesized weapons are?

    Just a thought.
    libertango: (Default)
    Morning Edition had a great commentary this morning. Here's how they characterize it:

    from Morning Edition, Tuesday , March 11, 2003
    In the latest in a series of commentaries on the subject of a possible war, commentator and retired Col. Mike Turner says he fears a worst-case scenario in a U.S. strike on Iraq -- hand-to-hand street battles in Baghdad, terrorist attacks at home and further nuclear development from North Korea. Turner was Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf's personal briefing officer during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.


    You can listen to the piece here. (NB: The file in that link is a RealAudio file, so you'll need the RealOne Player to listen.)

    Oh, and for the knee-jerk media hawks: Yeah. Schwarzkopf's personal briefing officer. There's a liberal voice for ya. How typical of NPR. :)
    libertango: (Default)
    US to Iraq: "You're not allowed to surrender. Who do you think you are, the Russians? We Old School Republicans learned our lesson when they surrendered. Why do you think we (rhetorically) delcared war on "terrorism", and not an actual party we can win against? The idea is war now, war tomorrow, war forever... Surrender? Heh. You wish!"

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    libertango: (Default)
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